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Abstract: Because of recent and rapid increases in immigration rates, Italy has been confronted with new forms of
cultural conflicts. Cultural conflicts have resulted in cultural offenses; these are acts committed and promoted by people
belonging to a minority culture that are considered to be offenses by the majority controlled legal system. In addition to
defining cultural offenses and presenting defenses that are presented when cultural offenses are tried, this paper
highlights pros, cons and potential pitfalls of considering culture under Italian law. Finally, suggestions to improve legal
considerations of cultural diversity in Italy are presented; specifically the creation of laws to exculpate offenders of minor
cultural offenses, the prioritization of justifications over excuses as a legal defense, and mitigated punishments in cases
of major cultural offenses.
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Cultural conflicts affect all levels of social
relationships between the existing majority culture that
maintains control over all institutions and the minority
cultures that are expected to acculturate. These
conflicts play out in both private and public spheres;
one of the most notable conflicts occurs when courts
are confronted with cultural offenses. Although,
defining a culturally based offense can be complicated,
numerous authors have expressed the need to define a
cultural offense (Basile, 2010; Bernardi, 2010; De
Maglie, 2010; Foblets, 1998); and have therefore cited
the definition put forth by Van Broeck (2001), “A
cultural offense is an act by a member of a minority
culture, which is considered an offense by the legal
system of the dominant culture. That same act is
nevertheless, within the cultural group of the offender,
condoned, accepted as a normal behavior and
approved or even endorsed and promoted in the given
situation” (p. 5). Furthermore, the Harvard Law Review
(1986) situates these offenses in societies, where
cultural fragmentation has a deep impact also on
criminal law. One such country that is currently
experiencing this transition is Italy. The total number of
immigrants in Italy increased from approximately
356,159 in 1991 to 4,387,721 as of January, 2013; the
most dramatic increases were noted between 1991 –
2001 in which the number of immigrants in Italy tripled
(ISTAT, 2009; ISTAT, 2012b; ISTAT, 2013a).
Furthermore, newly imported religions and their
associated customs and practices further complicate
this discussion.
Although increases in immigration rates alone do
not automatically create culture conflicts, in terms of
*Address correspondence to this author at the University of New Haven, West
Haven USA; Tel: 1 (203) 479-4591; E-mail: ttamborra@newhaven.edu
E-ISSN: 1929-4409/15

application of the law, a more homogenous society will
be more perplexed by cultural offenses. Caputo (2005)
notes that Italian policies tend to be inspired by severe
cultural homogenization and a discriminatory attitude
toward cultural diversity. Furthermore, this reliance on
cultural homogeneity is reflected in the Italian Penal
Code report. Bernardi (2010) and De Maglie (2010)
both note that the report includes the following quote,
“Lo Stato ci appare come la nazione medesima in esso
organizzata, cioè come un'unità non solo sociale, ma
altresì etnica, legata da vincoli di razza, di lingua, di
costume, di tradizioni storiche, di moralità, di religione”
(The State seems to us as the nation itself is
organized, actually as a unit not only social, but
moreover ethnically, tied by bonds of race, of language,
of customs, of historic traditions, of morality, of religion)
(p. 62; p. 34). Finally, Grosso (2006) notes that the
Italian Constitution is also based on a shared cultural
pattern of values.
The intersection of the sudden increase in
immigration rates, and socio-politically homogeneous
preferences suggest that Italy may be unprepared to
consider and legally address cultural offenses. This
lack of preparation may be a product of the relatively
few discussions on this topic. Therefore, the overall
purpose of this paper is to expose the reader to the
complexity, both philosophically and pragmatically,
associated with cultural offenses and subsequently
employed cultural defenses, such as justifications and
excuses, presented in Italian courts. In order to
accomplish this task, this paper first presents data
regarding rising immigration rates in Italy. Next, this
paper defines culture and explores the relationship
between law and the evolution of culture. Subsequent
sections examine cultural defenses, as well as consider
© 2015 Lifescience Global
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whether punishment determinations should consider
culture as a mitigating factor. The pros, cons and
potential pitfalls of acknowledging cultural offenses
under Italian law are then considered. Finally, a
discussion of how and why Italy should legally
recognize cultural offenses and therefore defenses, is
put forth.
IMMIGRATION RATES
ISTAT (2009) reported that there were 3,423,651
immigrants in Italy, in 2008. Of this group, there was an
approximate 50/50 split between men and women, and
the majority settled in Northern Italy. Additionally,
ISTAT (2013a) reported there were over 4,000,000
foreign national residents in Italy, as of January 2013.
In addition to this, the immigration growth rate is nearly
twice that of the national average rate (ISTAT, 2012a).
However, it should be noted that these are mostly likely
underestimates because they do not capture
undocumented immigrants or to short-term visitors, and
both of these categories may affect rates of cultural
offenses. As such, it has been estimated that 5 million
immigrants were reported in Italy in 2011 and that 10%
were undocumented immigrants (European Migration
Network, 2012; Eurostat, 2011).
In addition to the numbers of immigrants present in
Italy, immigrants’ countries of origin, religions, and
economic statuses are worth noting. According to
ISTAT (2013b), 2012 data indicate that most
immigrants came from either Eastern Europe (Romania
and Albania) or Northern Africa (Morocco, Tunisia,
Egypt). Although ascertaining exact religious affiliation
data from Italy can be complicated, data indicate that
estimates of Catholics in Italy have decreased in recent
years. EURISPES (2010) indicate that 76.5% of Italians
report that they are Catholic compared to EURISPES
(2006) data that indicated 87.8% was Catholic. Reports
also indicate that approximately 33% of immigrants
practice Catholicism and 11% are atheist or agnostic,
the remaining immigrants practice other religions such
as Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism (Institute of CaritasMigrantes, 2011). Finally, the rate of unemployment is
reported to be higher among immigrants than nationals,
14.1% versus 10.7% respectively. Collectively the data
reveal that immigration rates in Italy are rapidly
increasing, newly imported religions are also
increasing, and that new immigrants are more likely to
be unemployed. Therefore, it is safe to assert that
immigrants in Italy, in general, represent an ethnic and
religious minority, and also are economically
disadvantaged. These factors must be considered
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when discussing cultural
intercultural societies.

conflicts

in

emerging

CULTURAL: A COMPLEX WHOLE
Basile (2010) notes that Tylor (1871) considers
culture to be a complex whole, which includes every
human activity; moreover, culture is something
acquired, not inborn in the individuals. Furthermore,
Basile also references Kluckhohn and Kroeber (1952)
who suggest that cultural systems consist of explicit
and implicit patterns of behavior, in which people learn
and teach through symbols, as a means of
summarizing and transmitting ideals. Geertz (1973)
also considers the importance of the transference of
symbols, "Culture is a historically transmitted pattern of
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of
which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their
knowledge about and attitudes toward life" (p. 89).
Therefore, culture is not a static system; a pure culture
does not exist. As a result, culture does not exist in and
of itself, but only in connection with a group. If
individuals could not change and rearrange their
patterns of behavior with reference to their life
experiences, culture would cease to exist.
The transmission of cultural traditions and values
occur at least twice for persons who are minorities in a
society, first, through the process of enculturation.
Enculturation is a cultural process by which individuals
are influenced by their own historical culture (most
often during childhood), consciously or even
unconsciously. It may be defined as the process by
which individuals acquire the knowledge, skills,
attitudes, and values (all of them can be called as
"ingroup values") that enable them to become
functioning members of their societies (Foblets, 1998).
"Individuals, because of enculturation, feel compelled
to respond to stimuli in differing ways. Culture affects
their perceptions and behavior in powerful ways,
without being conscious of it" (Renteln, 2009, p. 796).
Next, minority groups (either indigenous or foreign)
may have their cultural traditions contested,
challenged, or changed in some other way that forces
them to adapt to the majority culture; this is known as
the acculturation process. Acculturation can be
described as the process by which individuals
rearrange and change their own cultural values
because of blending with other cultural patterns (Van
Broeck, 2001). Minorities
may spontaneously
acculturate, but it is more likely that the dominant group
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compels the minority group to acculturate by imposing
their cultural values upon them, and encouraging
and/or forcing the minority group to abandon their
culture; in this way acculturation becomes an
homogenization process. However, the social reality is
that some minority groups, when faced with the
pressure to assimilate to the dominant culture, do not
always abandon their own values. On the contrary,
core values can be enshrined and reinforced, in order
to preserve one’s traditional identity. Subsequently,
minorities may be more dependent on their social
groups, further reinforcing the need to preserve their
cultural identity. In this sense, although the majority
culture wants the minority to abandon his/her values
and "acculturate", this process could produce minority
culture members who are more vested in preserving
their cultural origin.
In conclusion, culture is a dynamic, complex
manifestation of history and values, often embodied in
symbols. Members of a group fluidly transmit and
inherit these symbols, consciously or otherwise through
the enculturation process and are then confronted with
the transmissions of culture through acculturation
process when they become or realize that they are a
minority in the larger society. Furthermore, intercultural
societies may have a greater set of problems as these
societies are categorized by daily interactions between
the majority and minority groups (Valier, 2003).
Although culture is a multifaceted concept,
pertaining to race, class, sex, sexuality, religion,
nationality, etc., this paper will focus on the aspects of
culture in which the individual is influenced by a system
of normative rules, embodied in traditions and mores,
that define how the individual member of the minorities
groups is likely to act in particular circumstances based
upon his/her self-perceived identity. Furthermore, it is
arguable that people consolidate their identity in acting
in compliance with their traditions, because on the one
hand, traditions act as a compelling factor for members
who share them; but on the other hand, they represent
one's deep identity against disintegration when persons
from differing cultures interact. These interactions can
result in cultural conflicts. Although cultural conflicts
can result from the same list of demographic factors
listed above, this paper will focus on cultural conflicts
resulting from clashes between non-Catholic, poor,
immigrant minorities and Italian law, which is the most
affective homogenizing instrument of the majority
culture.
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CULTURAL OFFENSES: A CLASH BETWEEN NEW
CULTURES AND ESTABLISHED LAWS
Campbell (2012) points out that, as noted by Gustav
Radbruch, “law is a cultural phenomenon”; however,
law does not generally explain its relationship to culture
or acknowledge the culturally motivated origins of such
law. Even more so, criminal law is arguably further
linked to culture, because of its innate role to defend
values and the national identity. If culture is seen as a
social scheme conveying implicit or explicit patterns of
behaviors, law should be considered one of the most
binding and broad agencies able to influence actions.
Furthermore, it has been argued that penal codes are
the most powerful weapon that the majority culture
possesses in terms of maintaining control over minority
groups (Baratta, 1976). Consequently, the law enforces
the norms of the dominant culture in order to maintain
its dominance (Campbell, 2012; Post, 2003).
Nevertheless, some requirements are needed in order
to assess if a cultural conflict amounts to a true cultural
offense.
De Maglie (2010) lists what is required to define a
cultural offense; firstly, there has to be a relevant link
between the offense and the cultural background of the
defendant. Therefore, the defendant’s cultural mores
must be able to "explain" the core of the fact. Secondly,
it must be established that the cultural motivation can
be generalized; that is to say that the cultural offense
must not be motivated by the offender's personal
beliefs, but rather by the culture and heritage of the
minority group to which the defendant belongs.
Nevertheless, this ascertainment must always consider
that cultural behavioral patterns are not standardized,
but they vary due to social positions; Van Broeck
(2001) notes, “when dealing with cultural offenses, that
one does not have to ask the question whether or not
every member of that culture should act the same way
in the circumstances at hand. Rather, the question
should be whether or not the offender should have
reacted as he or she did” (p. 11).
In addition, Renteln (2004) notes that cultural
evidence should be considered, as culture shapes
cognition and conduct of individuals. Furthermore,
respecting one’s cultural identity is considered to be a
"polyethnic right" that immigrants should be entitled to,
although they have no prior relationship with the host
country (Meer & Modood, 2012). This is of particular
importance as Italy rapidly becomes an intercultural
country. Although Italy has been considered for
centuries a multicultural country (i.e., regional
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differences resulting in varying dialects, customs and
rituals), increasing rates of non-Catholic, poor,
immigrants have created tension. In this way, Italy is
not different from other Western societies affected by
globalization trends. Therefore, Italian law should focus
consider an offender’s culture; this consideration
should be conveyed through cultural defenses.
Justifications and excuses as "cultural defenses":
Should culture negate responsibility?
The definition of a cultural defense is not contained
in any statutes or official report, however the term has
been discussed by several authors (Chiu; 1994;
Foblets, 1998; Harvard Law Review, 1986; Mezzetti,
2013; Renteln, 2009; Van Broeck, 2001). A cultural
defense pertains to any doctrine that recognizes a
defendant’s “cultural background to negate or mitigate
criminal liability” (Kim, 1997, pp. 102 - 103). Cultural
defenses, even in the most multicultural of societies,
such as the U.S., are frowned upon because they have
been viewed as incompatible with the Rule of Law
(Heller, 2012). Furthermore, Italian law does not
recognize such defenses, given the fact that it has only
recently been confronted with such considerations
(Monticelli, 2003). Therefore, we cannot reference
specific Italian cases in which a cultural defense was
officially used. As such, we put forth two examples of
widely known U.S. cases; these cases are often cited
in Italian legal scholarship. In the case People v.
Kimura, No. A-09113 (L.A. Sup. Ct. 1985), a JapaneseAmerican woman attempted to commit oyako-shinju
(parent-child suicide) after learning that her husband
was unfaithful. It was argued that killing yourself and
your children is a customary response in her situation.
She was sentenced to probation as a result of a
temporary insanity defense, on account of the cultural
conflict in which she had found herself.
Additionally, in People v. Moua, n. 315972-0
(Fresno County), Kong Moua, of Hmong culture, was
accused of raping and kidnapping a woman of his
group, after performing the required courtship. He
claimed that he wanted to realize zij poj niam or
marriage by capture, according to his cultural tradition.
The defendant argued that he had made a mistake of
fact, compelled by his cultural beliefs about zij poj
niam. The Court allowed him to enter a plea for a
reduced false imprisonment charge and completely
dropped the rape charge, although the Hmong
community and victim family did not recognize the fact
as zij poj niam.
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Although Italian law does not recognize the general
concept of a Common Law "defense", and Italian law
does not provide a specific doctrine to convey
offender's cultural background in the trial, judges tend
to use justifications and excuses when presented with
a cultural offense (Monticelli, 2003). Under Italian law
there are differences between what could be
considered to be justifications and excuses. Among
several doctrines that can be used in a trial to put
forward cultural factors, the exercise of a right
Justification (Article 51 of the C.P.) and the mistake of
law Excuse (Article 5 of the C. P.) represent the most
noteworthy references to this issue.
Justifications
Justifications, such as self-defense or the exercise
of a right, serve as just causes for committing an act
that would otherwise be unlawful (Horowitz, 1986).
They are considered to be the point at which social
conflicts can be addressed by criminal law in that
justifications reflect the social order of interests since
justified acts are not considered to be socially
undesirable facts by law (Roxin, 1973). Therefore, the
person responsible for a justified act does not have to
be rehabilitated through punishment. Even when a
justified act is not considered to be a good action (e.g.,
the death of the offender), justifications always reflect
what the law considers to be the right action to take in
a particular case. Furthermore, justifications discourage
crimes by legitimating a forcible response to them. As a
result, they may be applied also to a third-party who
assists the actor (Horowitz, 1986). Moreover, the
perpetrator who becomes the victim of a justified action
(e.g., self-defense) has no right to defend him/herself,
whereas the perpetrator who becomes the victim of an
excused act has the right to defend against it.
Article 51 of the Codice Penale (C.P.) justifies
offenses committed by an offender who is practicing a
right, because the law cannot forbid an act that is also
considered to be an exercise of a right. But this
doctrine does not define what a right is and what the
boundaries are; therefore this doctrine is widely
criticized by some authors. For instance, Viganò (2006)
notes that this doctrine seems to place these rights
over the offense, rather than describing the limits of the
right in relation to the offense.
Therefore, the question is whether the right to one’s
culture justifies offenses prohibited by law. To answer
this question, one must first consider that culture as a
human right, is recognized under various Italian laws

Emerging Cultural Conflicts in Italy

and International Covenants. Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) enacted in 1978 stated that ethnic and
religious minority groups cannot be deprived of the
right to have their own cultural life and to practice their
own religion and language with their other members of
their group. In addition, Article 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 18 of the
ICCPR and Articles 2, 19, and 21 of the Italian
Constitution also establishes that persons have the
right to freedoms of thought, conscience and religion,
including religious practices.
Although it seems culture is recognized as a
fundamental human right, inner and outer boundaries
of the concept need to be defined in order to balance it
with other important interests that can require criminal
law enforcement. For instance, the act must be
justifiable and proven to be an exercise of the person’s
rights; the defendant’s intent is not enough to make the
act lawful (Del Corso, 2011; Viganò, 2006).
Furthermore, the type of offense committed must be a
consideration. For instance, offenses that offend
supreme interests must be excluded from justification.
We should note that supreme interests under Italian
law cannot be listed or readily defined, as they emerge
in judicial evaluations. However, rights explicitly defined
as "inviolable" by the Italian Constitution or
international covenants can be considered supreme
interests; they represent core values of Italian society.
Supreme interests can be set aside only when specific
legal conditions occur, but hardly ever for cultural
factors. Furthermore, Viganò (2006) and Provera
(2010) deem that religious freedom cannot be limited to
worship, promotion and religious beliefs, but it has to
include the freedom to live according to one’s own
beliefs; that is a concept very similar to culture.
Therefore, neither religious freedom nor the right to
culture can justify the actions and therefore exempt
from punishment, a defendant who has offended a
supreme interest such as the deprivation of life,
freedom, and sexual liberty, for instance, in order to
exercise religious beliefs or right to uphold cultural
norms.
It is arguably easier to exclude from justification,
offenses that are meant to inflict serious harm (e.g.,
murder or rape) while upholding cultural norms.
However, the more complex discussion pertains to
offenses that do not offend supreme interests and/or
those that are trivial or not very harmful, such as
bigamy, incest (between adults), the possession of
ritual (illegal) drugs, environmental crimes (e.g., the
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throwing of human remains in nature), and the
criminalization of wearing traditional clothing (burqas
and turbans). In fact, if law punished such cultural
offenses, rehabilitation and social cohesion alike would
be made impossible. Italian judges seem to accept this
premise. For instance, the Court of Cremona (sent.
19/02/09, n. 15) acquitted a Sikh worshipper of illegal
weapon possession (Sikhs carry a small knife called
kirpan), because Italian law 110/1975 does not forbid
weapon possession when a "justifiable reason" is
presented. The judge issued an acquittal and noted
that the act was justified as the defendant has a right to
exercise his religious freedom (art. 19 Cost). In another
case described by Gatta (2009), a woman wearing a
burqa was before the court for violating the antiterrorism law 152/1975. The law prevents people from
being unrecognizable, by helmets, scarfs and anything
else; however, the law does not forbid covering onesself when there is a "justifiable reason". The woman
was eventually acquitted, but the Court did not evaluate
if a cultural factor could have amounted to a "justifiable
reason.” Instead, the acquittal was reached, according
to the judge, because the woman had not performed a
crime, since she had uncovered her face, when asked
by a policewoman (in a private room), in order to be
identified.
In conclusion, although an intercultural society has
to put some limits on individualized expressions of
behavior, the right to culture should be prioritized when
there is no risk of endangering human rights or
offending against supreme interests. Therefore, cultural
differences must be protected through criminal law
when they represent a way to preserve minority groups
from majority interference. External protections,
according to Kymlicka (1995) such as statutory
exemptions from dress codes and permission to use
reasonable amount of ritual drugs should be afforded to
minority cultures.
Excuses
Excuses, on the contrary, are an exculpatory
category by which the actor is exempted by
punishment on account of abnormal conditions (e.g.,
minor age, insanity, unavoidable mistake of law)
making her/him not blameworthy, as s/he could not
have been required to comply with the law in such a
case. Excuses are considered to be the most
applicable criminal law category for cultural evidence
as they require an individualized judgment; and
specifically the Article that addresses the Mistake of
Law would best apply in Italy. The Mistake of Law is an
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excuse that is put forth under Article 5 of the C.P.
Italian criminal law establishes that the defendant can
be excused when ignoring criminal rules, only provided
that the Mistake of Law is declared unavoidable. It can
involve either absolute ignorance of the law or
ignorance /mistake through which the defendant is
aware of the law but believes that s/he is acting
lawfully.
Italian judges, confronted with cultural offenses,
attribute mistake of law to inadequate social
integration; as a result, the defendant earns a complete
acquittal if such defense is proved (Basile, 2010;
Bartoli, 2005; Bernardi, 2006). This doctrine is widely
used to put forward cultural factor by Italian judges. For
example, in a recent case (Cass. pen., sez. VI, sent.
22/06/2011, n. 43646) annotated by D’Ippolito (2012) a
Nigerian woman, accused of unauthorized exercise of
medical science (she had her son circumcised by
another woman) was excused. The Court deemed that
she did not know Italian law and her Mistake of Law
was declared unavoidable, on account of her scarce
social integration in Italian society. Although this
doctrine is widely used by Italian judges, it may not be
the most appropriate; this paper will address our
concerns with this application in a subsequent section.
Both justifications and excuses lead to an acquittal
when the facts of the case support such a
determination. However some cultural offenses,
because of their seriousness, cannot be acquitted on
account of a cultural factor. In such cases, the cultural
background of the defendant may still be considered;
however, the consideration is applied at the sentencing
stage.
Do Punishments in Italy Consider Culture?
When an acquittal cannot be achieved through a
cultural defense, for instance in cases in which the
cultural offender violates the supreme interests, cultural
factors can be considered at the punishment stage.
This consideration is indirectly referenced under the
Italian Constitution and directly referenced in Italian
case law; although it should be noted that there is a
paucity of case law that directly references culture at
sentencing.
Despite the Constitution’s loose or indirect
reference to punishment goals, Moccia (1992) notes
Italian judges do not explain their reasoning when
sentencing and they are not prone to consider
constitutionally binding punishment aspirations to be
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obligatory. As a result, Italian case law in which cultural
factors have had a mitigating effect, or at least put forth
a discussion about this issue, is very scarce.
Nevertheless, there is a case in which the
defendant’s culture was considered at sentencing. In
the case Cass. Pen., VI sez. (26/12/08, n. 46300) a
Muslim father was accused of child abuse for battering
his daughter in order to reinforce rules put forth in the
Quran. The defendant argued that criminal law should
have considered his cultural values before charging
him. He denied the existence of mens rea on account
of a cultural factor; he argued that battering is
considered to be a means of education in his culture.
The Court rejected his pleading, because constitutional
values are an “insurmountable barrier” that prevents
defendants from introducing customs, usages and rules
that violate human rights. Although he was convicted,
the Court of Cassation decided to take defendant's
cultural background into consideration at sentencing to
ensure that the punishment served a rehabilitative
purpose. Unfortunately, the exact punishment was not
published; this is common under Italian law. The
Supreme Court of Cassation does not generally
establish the actual punishment; instead it delegates
this responsibility to inferior courts whose verdicts are
rarely published.
In contrast, there was a case in which the
defendant’s culture was considered at sentencing to be
justification for increasing the sentence. The Court of
Padova, in sent. 09/06/06, n. 446, condemned two
Pakistani men, accused of rape; the judge deemed that
“the more individual and cultural conditions are different
from mainstream culture, the more severe must be
punishment, in order to have a deterrent impact on
society.” The sentence therefore was harsher, in spite
of the defendants' request for a lesser punishment on
account of a cultural factor.
Although there is a paucity of case law and statute
references to cultural consideration at sentencing,
there does seem to be enough to signal that Italian law
can incorporate cultural considerations at sentencing.
However, in cases that violate the supreme interests,
Italian law must balance at least two goals of criminal
law. On one hand, there is a cultural offender
compelled by his/her cultural dogmas and is arguably
less blameworthy because of the enculturation
phenomenon. However, on the other hand a supreme
interest has been violated that has produced a victim
and affected public sentiment.
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The Pros, Cons
Considering Culture

and
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Potential

Pitfalls

of

This section examines the importance of cultural
considerations as applied at all stages of Italian law,
the creation of laws, the enforcement of laws, and the
punishment of offenses. However, this section also
recognizes that such considerations cannot be
achieved without acknowledging complex dilemmas,
confronting competing interests, and encountering
potential obstacles.
Pros
There is both theoretical and pragmatic value in
recognizing the perspectives of varied cultures when
creating criminal laws. However, we must first
acknowledge that these benefits exist when applied to
matters that do not offend the supreme interests; De
Maglie (2010) notes that criminal law should not
intervene in social group dynamics, when offenses do
not involve supreme interests. However, even in cases
that do offend the supreme interest, there are still
benefits to considering culture; the law may not
exculpate the offender, but it may benefit from
punishing the offender less harshly.
Advocates of cultural diversity argue that cultural
pluralism is a value in itself (Harvard Law Review,
1986; Kim, 1997). The pursuit of pluralism is worth
protecting even through an exculpatory or mitigating
defense. Otherwise, as the Harvard Law Review (1986)
notes, there is an "overkill" risk; "in the zeal to quash
certain undesirable values or manifestation of those
values, the majority may inadvertently destroy
desirable values as well" (p. 1302). In addition, the
acknowledgment of cultural factors can produce more
practical benefits; removing punishment for minor
cultural offenses or enacting less punishment for major
ones, can promote a more peaceful relationship
between the cultural groups that co-exist in a society.
This may foster social cohesion, which is an implicit
punishment goal noted in the Italian Constitution. It is
also arguable that recognizing cultural factors can be a
way to rehabilitate the society; Baratta (1976) notes
that before changing excluded people, we might
change an excluding society by addressing the
exclusion process. Furthermore, the promotion of multiculturally inclusive policies and laws are inspired by the
pursuit of equality; they acknowledge that existing
cultural differences need to be preserved and/or
recognized, as minority groups may not have the power
to preserve or promote their culture. Authors report this
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trend in Anglo-Saxon countries (Basile, 2010; Bernardi,
2006; De Maglie, 2010). For instance, laws that
endorse affirmative action policies in the United States
appreciate the need to recognize culture as an integral
part of an inclusive society in which the interests of
diverse groups are valued. Such laws strive to prevent
inequality in education, work and other public sectors.
Furthermore, the British Road Traffic Act (1988) allows
Sikh people to wear turbans instead of helmets and the
Slaughterhouses Act (1974) allows Muslims and Jews
to slaughter animals according to their customs, even if
the act is considered to be animal mistreatment.
“Treating persons raised in a foreign culture differently
should not be viewed as a exercise in favoritism, but
rather as a vindication of the principles of fairness and
equality that underlie a system of individualized justice"
(Harvard Law Review, 1986, p. 1299).
Additionally, considerations of cultural differences
when creating law may reduce a trend known in the
U.S. as “over-criminalization”. Over-criminalization
refers to the use of criminal law to solve any social
problem. The over reliance of criminal law enforcement
occurs because criminal law enforcement is easy to
arrange, it does not produce immediate economic costs
and it provides electoral consensus. This trend is
evident in both Italy and in the U.S. As for cultural
offenses, over-criminalization is a rough response to
intercultural problems; instead of setting up integration
policies, with economic and social interventions, overcriminalization tends to worsen relations with
immigrants. Smith (2012) notes that even judges are
responsible for over-criminalization, by expanding
criminal statutes. Evidence of this can be found in
previously mentioned cases in which anti-terrorism
laws and laws pertaining to weapons possession have
been applied to cases involving cultural offenses, even
if these laws were not intended to apply to such cases.
Laws generally resolve only the most frequently
occurring and common cultural conflicts. When the
recognition of culture does not occur at the law making
stage, criminal cases should be able to present a
cultural defense. The need for cultural defenses cannot
be underestimated, as it is impossible to expect that
the law can foresee and/or consider every situation in
which a cultural conflict might result. Smith (2012) has
noted that, "defenses have a vital role to play in
keeping criminal liability within appropriate bounds” (p.
577).
Finally, when cultural factors are not considered at
the law making stage or law enforcement stage (e.g.,
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trial) there are benefits to considering culture at the
punishment stage. Punishments that consider culture
are more socially inclusive and reflective of the goals of
a democratic state; they ensure that offender
rehabilitation, the primary aim of the Italian
Constitution, is prioritized. Without acknowledging that
the offender’s motivations may be rooted in cultural
norms and therefore administering a punishment that
addresses these cultural norms, true rehabilitation is
not possible.
Cons
Arguments against cultural considerations at all
stages of law enforcement draw attention to the rights
of the victim. Victims of cultural offenses could be less
protected than other victims. Because victims and
offenders often share a cultural background (Kymlicka,
1995), a cultural defense is criticized because it could
prioritize the strongest members of the group against
the traditionally weaker members (e.g., women and
children). In addition, the recognition of cultural factors
in the law-making process and in trials is said to be
able to undermine social cohesion around common
values. Kim (1997) notes that the law must lay down
rules compelling obedience regardless of an
individual’s background, in order to maintain social
order. A breakdown of social cohesion could adversely
affect the majority. Majority members could feel
abandoned by their institutions, in particular the law
and criminal justice system. Therefore, opponents of a
cultural defense may deem that it could, in part, deprive
the existing majority society from its own identity.
It can also be argued that cultural considerations
negate the need to rehabilitate the offender. These
arguments consider cultural offenders to require
treatment, since they have violated the law. Therefore,
treatment or rehabilitation cannot be achieved if the
offense is eliminated, via legal statutes, or justified at
trial. Furthermore, the behavior of the offender may be
considered to be hostile and dangerous, and without
the treatment the offender may pose additional risks to
society.
Finally culture, as previously mentioned, is
something difficult to define in general and even more
so when applied to the law. Furthermore, the impact of
acculturation on a society is not static. Therefore,
culturally rooted patterns of behavior can change when
they interact with other cultures and as such it is
arguably difficult to identify which behaviors can be
attributed to which culture. Likewise, it can be difficult
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to recognize behavior as an expression of culture if
culture is a result of the integration of foreign values
assimilation and the reinforcement of the primary
culture.
Potential Pitfalls
One of potential pitfall of considering culture at point
of trial is that case law, rather than statutory law, is
better equipped to consider cultural conflicts. Statutory
law, as is used in Italy, is written law set down by
Parliament; it produces a rigid arrangement of
conflicting interests by which only one interest will
prevail. But, as we have noted, this arrangement works
only when law deals with frequent, common and minor
cultural conflict. Other cultural conflicts can amount to
what Hart (2012) calls "hard cases"; they are cases in
which there is no automatic "right answer". Italian case
law, which does not acknowledge precedence, creates
a situation in which these issues will be continuously
revisited, even if decided in previous cases. Even if it
can be a flexible solution for "hard cases", certainty and
equality might be jeopardized by this trend in countries,
like Italy, where stare decisis is not strictly binding
(Basile, 2010; Caputo, 2005). As noted, prior judicial
decisions do not strictly bind other judges to follow
them. Although, they have a strong persuasive effect,
especially when decisions come from the Supreme
Court of Cassation, Italian judges can decide
differently. As such, a pitfall of considering culture at
trial is that, even if it can produce fairer solutions, there
is no certainty that the results will set precedence.
In addition to this, Italian jurisprudence is generally
conservative regarding what Basile (2010) refers to as
"normative cultural elements" (p. 133). Normative
cultural elements are words and sentences in laws that
can be interpreted very differently on the basis of the
cultural values that are the basis of the interpretation.
Basile (2010) notes that Italian judges always interpret
such language of law, which is sensitive to cultural
background by using stereotyping clauses such as
“according to mainstream sense”, “according to shared
social rules”, and “according to cultural common
heritage”. These clauses suggest that there is a
generally narrow-minded attitude among Italian judges
towards cultural diversity.
Additionally,
a
general
pitfall
of
culture
considerations is the potential stereotyping effect when
excuses, rather than justifications, are used at trial.
U.S. case law can serve as an example of this. The
insanity defense is often used as cultural evidence in
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the U.S., as such in the leading case People v. Kimura,
No. A-09113 L.A. Sup. Ct. 1985. The defendant’s
cultural background was used to prove her mental
instability that, in turn, excused her. This excuse had a
negative stereotyping effect, treating cultural diversity
like mental illness. As Reddy (2002) notes, there is a
trend to pathologize cultural factors; this results from
attempts to make a defendant's cultural background
evaluation more accessible to the court. However, it is
also a manifestation of the preemptive power by the
dominant culture, which pathologizes the behaviors of
the minority culture. When this occurs, the majority
culture assumes the role of healer, responsible for
fixing the maladjusted minority offender. Paradoxically,
cultural considerations can lead to the very outcome
that proponents of cultural considerations would like to
prevent, cultural exclusion. The social exclusion of
cultural offenders can result when they are viewed to
be maladjusted, impaired or primitive people. Even
more so, since culturally based evidence needs to
demonstrate that there was a cultural motivation (that is
to say, the cultural offense has to be the result of a
group's culture not of a personal belief), the
stereotyping effect extends to the entire cultural group.
Finally, all societies, but especially intercultural
societies, have to cope with the political ramifications of
culture considerations. Consorte (2013) considers that
real or supposed failures about immigration policies
and the emotional involvement of the people conveyed
through the mass-media may push governments to
exploit culture diversity in order to gain electoral
consensus. This is risk worth taking into consideration
when we elaborate on cultural diversity issues,
especially referring to criminal law.
CONCLUSIONS
Although culture is not the only reason for an action,
culture has a deep impact on actions; actions are
hardly ever a rational outcome of the mere awareness
of right and wrong, but more frequently "right" and
"wrong" are filtered through cultural values. Therefore,
it seems clear that Italy’s legal system must address
one of the products of its newly intercultural society,
cultural offenses. Previous sections have presented
Italy’s current stance on cultural offenses by presenting
relevant laws, cases and reasoning. This section
presents suggestions for how Italy might incorporate
culturally inclusive legal remedies when confronted with
cultural offenses. Before presenting these suggestions
we must note that cultural considerations at any stages
should only be applied in the offender’s favor. Insofar
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as a society wants minority groups to accept common
values, penalizing cultural offenders hardly produces
integration; rather cultural offenders, who commit minor
offenses, will be alienated. Cultural considerations at
any stage, from law creation to punishment that
consider culture to be an aggravating factor, violate
human rights considerations and the Constitutionally
promoted punishment aims. As such, any suggestion
must be in accordance with implicit and explicit
directives put forth under the Italian Constitution. The
Italian Constitution (Article 27) establishes that criminal
punishment should prioritize rehabilitation as the
central justification of criminal punishment.
We assert that Italian law should adopt a multipronged approach when considering cultural offenses.
First, for minor offenses that do not offend supreme
interests and are more consistent with culture as a
fundamental right, culturally inclusive laws should be
the first attempt to officially recognize culture in relation
to the law. Second, because no law can be expected to
remedy all behaviors, justifications should be
considered when minor cultural offenses are presented
in Italian courts. Third, when cultural offenses offend
supreme interests they cannot be justified as a right to
culture, and therefore such offenses should be
punished; however, punishments should consider that
the defendant’s culpability is reduced. Finally, we
assert that criminal law is not the most appropriate
place to address interculturalism. All too often the
criminal justice system is left to handle issues that
should be addressed by other social institutions.
Creating Culturally Inclusive Laws
There is a paucity of culturally inclusive laws for
what could be characterized as political laziness. Also,
this issue is politically thorny. The majority constituents
may rebel if new groups are given consideration; this is
of utmost concern given the contemporary economic
turbulence in Italy. Therefore, the Italian Parliament
rarely passes politically sensitive laws that would be
more consistent with Constitution, in essence
delegating political responsibilities to judges who must
interpret and apply law at trial.
These political elements are compounded by the
fact that the Italian legal system does not recognize
stare decisis (an interpretation oriented towards
Constitution is not binding for future decisions).
Therefore, laws are not being passed and culturally
inclusive legal decisions do not serve as precedent.
Therefore, we assert that culturally inclusive laws must
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be created to handle common, frequent minor cultural
offenses; they are more certain and equitable.
Moreover, culturally inclusive laws can reduce overcriminalization. Larkin (2013) addresses numerous
reasons to avoid over-criminalization. First, he notes
that if the penal codes regulate too many behaviors, it
becomes difficult for the average person to know what
is forbidden; in essence there is no guiding principle.
Also, the courts will be less likely to curb law
enforcement excesses, because the police will almost
always have probable cause to arrest someone for
something. Finally, the criminal process will be more
easily influenced or corrupted by special interest
groups, “because every private party will vie for
economic rents by making a criminal out of a rival” (p.
756).
Although Italy rarely opts for culturally inclusive
laws, there is at least one instance in which it did.
Italian law 439/1978 justifies Muslims and Jews animal
slaughtering practices; these practices are not
considered to be animal mistreatment crimes, when
committed in connection with religious slaughtering.
This law was passed in response to European Directive
74/577/CEE, which states that every animal has to be
stunned before slaughtering it. Italian law 439/1978
(article 4) excludes punishment for slaughtering by
ritual bleeding. Moreover, the law provides some rules
to follow in order to balance religious freedom with
animal pain. The law establishes that experienced
people must carry out the slaughtering, the knife must
be sharp, the throat must be cut immediately, and the
animal must not be upset or frightened. This culturally
inclusive law is the result of a positive dialogue
between the Italian Government and both the Islamic
Cultural Center and the Jewish Community Center who
asked for permitting such slaughtering. This can
become a model to follow in order to introduce similar
laws for other minor but frequent cultural offenses that
do not necessarily also involve religious considerations
(e.g., khat usage does not deal with religion, but it
could be justified by a culturally inclusive law). Also,
such laws can provide better relations between social
groups. For instance, without a rule about ritual
slaughtering Jews and Muslims could have decided to
buy illegally imported meats, or to slaughter animals in
a way that could be considered animal mistreatment.
Culturally inclusive laws can be more practicable
and flexible than other legal remedies. They also
address the heart of the matter; they are proactive
solutions that represent a democratic society
committed to respecting individual expressions of
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behavior. Finally, culturally inclusive law creation
should be the bedrock of a democracy. Two of the
main principles of a democratic state are to ensure
human rights and represent the will of the people; the
state, when possible, must ensure these principles
apply to all people.
Minor Cultural Offenses: Justifications that Allow
Persons to Exercise their Rights
We deem that minor cultural offenses (offenses that
do not offend supreme interests), which cannot be
remedied through the creation of culturally inclusive
laws, should be justified. Justifications are more
suitable than excuses when applied to cultural
offenses. First, Article 51 of the C.P (Justification of
exercise of right) is a solution that targets cultural
conflicts in minor cultural offenses; when culture as a
fundamental right is not involved, as such as in cases
in which immigrants simply ignore criminal laws without
any reference to cultural conflicts, the offense cannot
be justified by Article 51 of the C.P. The issue will deal
with immigrants criminality, but it is a different, though
related, subject as some evidences show (Foblets,
1998; Tonry, 1997; Tonry, 1998). Furthermore, there
are less stereotyping effects; justified cultural offenses
are not based on a negatively valued motivation, such
as the ignorance of law, or insanity, but rather a
positively valued motivation (the exercise of a right). As
a result, the dominant culture, in cases in which
supreme interests are not offended must concede on
the basis of cultural pluralism, which should be valued
in democratic societies.
Major Cultural Offenses: Non-Negotiable Interests
and Sentencing Solutions
Society must continue to punish certain cultural
offenses, in order to defend the values of native people
and victim's human rights, even if punishment must
never be exemplary or discriminatory. For instance,
balancing victim protection with individualizing
treatments for cultural offenders is the very matter of
criminal law in a multicultural society.
Therefore, we deem that supreme interests,
offended by gross violations such as murder, rape,
kidnapping, torture, segregation and slavery are not
negotiable. In such cases, even when culture is a
factor, the action is deserving of punishment. In such
cases one’s fundamental right to culture cannot be
considered; this assertion is not based on an
ethnocentric point of view that privileges predominant
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values over those of foreign cultures. On the contrary,
supreme interests are the essential foundation of every
society, even intercultural societies, and criminal law
represents the most fundamental mechanism to defend
them. As Höffe (2001) notes, a true "foreigner" does
not exist in relation to supreme interests; they belong to
the heritage of mankind, and criminal laws defending it
tend to undertake a "trans-cultural foundation" (p. 136).
Nevertheless, persons who commit major cultural
offenses should receive a mitigated punishment on
account of cultural factors. Arguably, the cultural
offender is less culpable because her/his action is,
consciously or less, more so influenced by his/her
cultural norms, on account of the enculturation
phenomenon. Punishing the cultural offender in the
same way as an offender belonging to cultural majority
group would be unfair, because the latter offender's
reason to act is not situated in a culturally rooted clash
of values. Furthermore, this inequity would have impact
rehabilitation attempts; they would be doomed to fail,
because a punishment perceived as unfair could
adversely impact an offender’s perception of the
majority group and its institutions, most notably criminal
law. Again, an interpretation of statutory law according
to Italian Constitution should bind judges to evaluate
cultural factors only as a mitigating circumstance, even
without a specific law that states this. A mitigated
punishment can be a reasonable point of balance
between the necessity to punish supreme interest
violations and the consideration of the cultural
offender’s mitigated culpability; rehabilitation could
produce fairer solutions. Cultural offenders would
understand that their behavior is not acceptable, but
they would be aware that the law considered their
culture, making them more prone to reintegrate
peacefully.
Additionally, Article 133 of the C.P. could be slightly
modified, making rehabilitation purposes clearer than
they are now. For instance, cultural motivations might
be explicitly inserted into the article. The article could
demand a consideration of cultural rules shared and
observed by cultural offenders' group, whose
compliance would have influenced a cultural offender's
conduct. This modification could make judges more
prone to consider culture at sentencing. Unfortunately,
it appears that the political and social atmosphere is far
from allowing Italy to make these statutory reforms.
Some sentencing guidelines already mentioned by
Article 133 of the C.P. could serve the purpose of
mitigating punishment. For instance, by considering
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either “criminal purpose” or “individual, familiar and
social conditions of the offender” the judges can
already consider the cultural background of the
offender, but in the previous sections we have noted
the paucity of cases considering culture in sentencing
phase. Therefore, either a new sentencing guideline or
a re-interpretation of some existing guidelines may
require an improvement in judicial attitudes towards
cultural diversity. Additionally, anthropologist and
sociologist witnesses should be more widely admitted
in order to highlight the cultural conflict behind the
offense in the trial. The judge may not have enough
knowledge to follow the cultural arguments; s/he will
need an expert witness, usually an anthropologist,
whose testimony is reliable and relevant (Kim, 1997).
Is Criminal Law the Right Place to Address Cultural
Conflicts?
We think that this overall solution may require a
balance between criminal law remedies and social
integration policies. The tensions resulting from
competing cultural interests cannot be remedied by
criminal law. This is not to say that decriminalization is
always advantageous; Hart (1963) notes that the
majority has the right to follow their own moral
convictions and preserve their "moral environment".
However, the preservation of the moral environment
must be balanced. This balance can only be achieved
when other institutions, such as social services, the
educational system and private law further develop
their cultural integration policies; thus, reducing the
burden on criminal law solutions. These policies should
not focus on orientating the immigrant to accept the
value system, yet rather these integration policies
should encourage a dynamic exchange between the
existing majority group and new groups. For instance,
the educational system could introduce students to
foreign cultural behaviors, by embracing cultural events
that promote international cuisines, and scholars and
writers other than Italians, other Europeans and
Americans. Likewise, working times should be
arranged so that ritual times for prayer could be
observed, and important holidays could be celebrated.
Cultural conflicts cannot be avoided; humans when
confronted with anything new are instinctually cautious
and skeptical. However, Italy must recognition that
integration and cultural inclusion is good for the sum of
its parts. The minority culture will feel acknowledged
and thus be more likely to be economically, politically
and emotionally engaged residents. The majority will
feel their culture is worth preserving as policies to
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integrate new groups simultaneously acknowledge the
new culture, while maintaining the existing culture’s
general principles. Furthermore, integration policies
adopted by various institutions will increase social
cohesion and reduce unfortunate consequences of
multiculturalism: animosity, distrust, and intolerance.
These consequences must be avoided in order to
promote the goals of the Italian Constitution, which
“recognize the dignity of the person, both as an
individual and in social groups.”
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